Questions and Themes for Further Discussion

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Questions and Themes for Further Discussion

Questions and Themes for Further Discussion

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Why Afghanistan?

 

In the wake of the 9/11 attacks, the goal of toppling the Taliban government that had granted safe haven to al Qaeda leadership enjoyed broad international support. It might even be argued that the goal was a strategic imperative for the United States. But eight years later, the US and NATO are faced with the task of supporting a corrupt, weak Afghan government in an effort ‘disrupt, dismantle and defeat al Qaeda’ and prevent their return to Afghanistan and Pakistan. Yet, al Qaeda is now a grouping of loosely affiliated militant organizations, as much an ideology as a unified movement. Is the focus on Afghanistan and Pakistan justified? Should al Qaeda’s presence in these two countries be any more worrying than in Somalia, Yemen or elsewhere in the world?

 

Can the Obama administration find a satisfactory solution to the conflict, one that can be achieved within a time frame, and at a cost, acceptable to the US public and other NATO participants? Is it simply a question of hitting on the correct tactics, a suitable counterinsurgency, counter-terror or nation-building programme? Or, is America impotent in the face of intractable local and regional problems over which it has no control? Is there a humanitarian alternative? That is, would the withdrawal of foreign troops and the infusion of international aid offer a way for the US to disengage and continue to combat terrorism at the same time?

 

Are US policymakers misguided in assuming a linkage between Afghanistan and Pakistan or are the two inextricably entwined? Is there an exclusively Afghan solution to the conflict? Does framing the conflict as ‘AfPak’ make sense? As some of the roundtable members pointed out, there are deep flaws in the language around ‘AfPak’. Is it correct to assume that one cannot be addressed without the other and that they pose a combined ‘problem’? Does it not ignore the fact that there is a Pakistani Taliban, one that threatens the Pakistani state, and an Afghan Taliban, whose leadership is based in Pakistan but whose goal is the return of Taliban rule in Afghanistan? If the gravest threat to American security interests is the ‘Talibanisation’ of Pakistan, far more worrisome to the United States and its allies than a terrorist-supporting Afghan state, does it make sense that the bulk of effort is being made in Afghanistan? If, as the president’s rhetoric suggests, the defeat of al Qaeda is the goal in the region, why are the US and Pakistani armies fighting the Taliban? Is defeating the Taliban a prerequisite of defeating al Qaeda?

 

What indications do these papers give us of the likely direction of US foreign policy, as well as that of other allies, in the near future? What does the future of the war in Afghanistan mean for Obama’s other foreign policy goals—reaching out to ‘the Muslim world’; addressing the Palestinian- Israeli conflict; dealing with Iran? Are his efforts in Afghanistan likely to help or hinder these other goals? Given his ambitious domestic agenda, is Obama taking on too much in the realm of foreign policy? What impact will the war have on the domestic front in the United States if it becomes America’s longest war?

 

Like the wars in Vietnam and Iraq, Afghanistan has thus far displayed how limited American military and economic power is in the face of what are essentially social and political problems. Why are US policymakers seemingly loathe to examine contemporary US foreign policy ventures in the context of these past failures? Why, when US policymakers do on occasion invoke ‘Munich’ or ‘Dien Bien Phu’, are they employing an appropriate or inappropriate analogy and understanding of history?

 

What does the conflict and occupation in Afghanistan and Pakistan reveal about America and its allies’ domestic cultures? What values are said to be threatened by the Taliban and al Qaeda, and how do these reveal a particular vision of world order that is often taken for granted in our domestic scenes?

 

The roundtable also raises some questions about the best way to approach the study of contemporary issues in US foreign policy. Written by historians, these papers examine the US intervention in the context of previous ventures in US foreign policy or, in the case of Kalinovsky’s paper, the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan. Does history offer us guidance, or would political science, security studies, sociology, anthropology or some combination of these be more appropriate? What methodological approach is most fruitful (and in what ways) when writing about contemporary, unfolding events? 

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